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This study aims to add to the understanding of inflation expectations in Turkey. We conduct several 
tests to understand whether economic agents use all the available information to forecast inflation. The 
answer is a lucid “NO”: Using 5 different quantitative expectations series from 3 different surveys, we 
find that all the expectations series, except the one month ahead forecasts, are biased and inefficient. 
Furthermore, forecast errors in many cases are significantly correlated with exchange rate changes, 
revealing that agents do not take into account the lagged effects of the exchange rate movements on 
inflation while forming their expectations. That is, the role of exchange rate pass-through, as a 
determinant of inflation, is not well understood. These results also suggest that some form of deviation 
from rational expectations may be necessary—at least during the disinflation period—in modeling 
inflation dynamics.  
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I. Introduction 
Understanding inflation expectations is focal to central banks⎯especially to those 
targeting inflation directly⎯for many reasons. First of all, inflation targeting is forward-
looking by its nature; any pro-active central bank has to monitor inflation expectations closely 
to assess whether the public’s perception is consistent with monetary policy commitments. 
Second, inflation expectations feed into inflation through many channels⎯both direct and 
indirect. Inflation expectations affect inflation directly through their influence on the wage 
and price setting decisions of economic agents. Moreover, expectations affect inflation 
indirectly by underlying economic decisions such as consumption, saving and investment. In 
highly debted countries such as Turkey, inflation expectations may play an even more 
important role through their effect on public domestic borrowing costs, which in turn may 
affect concerns about debt sustainability and influence other key variables such as the 
exchange rate and risk premium that feed back into inflation. Hence, inflation expectations 
provide a key input to the modeling process. 
Third, output-inflation trade-off is mostly determined by inflation expectations (Friedman, 
1968 and Phelps, 1968). This point is also related to how the conduct of monetary policy is 
affected by inflation expectations. If inflation expectations of the public are in accordance 
with the inflation target, the central bank would have an opportunity to ignore short-term 
fluctuations in inflation and take a more medium-term approach to controlling inflation. 
However, in an opposite situation where expectations are not in line with the inflation target, 
the central bank may be forced to conduct a more aggressive monetary policy as to convince 
wage and price setters that the inflation target will be attained (Ranchhod, 2003). To put it 
differently, monetary policy credibility, which is revealed by inflation expectations, is an 
indispensible part of the monetary policy. 
Needless to say, any technical assessment of inflation expectations has many different 
dimensions. In this study, we focus on the “rationality” of inflation expectations in Turkey. 
We do not explicitly deal with credibility issues or how inflation expectations are formed. Nor 
we ask the question whether they are backward looking or forward looking. We just seek to 
answer whether inflation expectations provide an unbiased predictor of future inflation, and/or 
whether they are formed by making efficient use of all available information in the economy.  
We think that assessing the rationality of private agents’ expectations is of central 
importance to a monetary authority both from the modeling and from the communications   2
perspective. If private expectations fail to be rational, either policy models should incorporate 
some degree of bounded rationality, or the central bank should spend more time to 
communicate its perception of “true” inflation dynamics (here we assume that central bank 
itself is rational). 
Towards this objective, using 5 different quantitative expectations series from 3 different 
surveys, we conduct tests for two separate hypotheses—unbiasedness and efficiency—to infer 
about the rationality of Turkish inflation expectations. We find that all the expectations series, 
except the one month ahead forecasts, are biased and inefficient, therefore not rational. 
Furthermore, forecast errors in many cases are significantly correlated with exchange rate 
changes, revealing that agents do not take into account the lagged effects of the exchange rate 
movements on inflation while forming their expectations. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we introduce the basic concepts 
and our methodology related to the rational expectations hypotheses. In section III, we 
describe various expectation series and their sources and present the empirical findings, 
leaving the last section to conclude. 
II. Methodology 
In this section, we introduce the concepts related to rational expectations and explain the 
hypotheses of interest. Then, we describe the possible problems related to estimation and 
testing and explain the methodology used to overcome these problems.  
Definitions and Hypotheses: 
We adopt Muth’s definition for rationality (Muth, 1961): Expectations are rational if they 
are equal to mathematical expectations conditional on the set of all information relevant for 
forecasting. Full rationality implies that all available information has been used in an optimal 
manner. The f-step ahead prediction (expectation) of inflation made at time t, 
f
t π , is said to be 
rational, and is optimal in the sense that no other unbiased predictor has smaller variance if 
 
( ) t f t
f
t I E + = π π ,           ( 1 )  
 
where  f t+ π  is inflation rate at time t+f, It is the information available at time t and E is the 
mathematical expectation operator.    3
This is equivalent to the statement  
( ) 0 = t
f





t π π ε − = + . If regression analysis shows 
f
t ε to be a statistically significant function 
of It, the hypothesis of full rationality can be rejected; in other words, forecasters do not make 
optimal use of all the available information.   
It is a clear fact that in making an inflation forecast only a set of all available information 
can be utilized, since the use of all information can be costly and infeasible. However, this 
does not imply that forecasts are not rational at all. This brings us to the concept of partial 
rationality as defined in Brown and Maital (1981).  
Suppose that the prediction 
f
t π  is incomplete, in the sense that  t I , the relevant 
information set available at time t, is not fully utilized. Predictions make efficient use of this 
subset of information when 
( ) t f t
f
t S E + = π π ,            ( 2 )  
( ) 0 = t
f
t S E ε ,            ( 2 ’ )  
where  t S  is a proper subset of  t I . This property, which Brown and Maital (1981) refer to as 
partial rationality means that the information actually used⎯whether or not it is actually 
complete⎯is used in an efficient manner. Partial rationality is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for full rationality.  
The partial rationality hypothesis, stated in (2’) can be broken into the separate 
hypotheses⎯as suggested by Brown and Maital (1981) and Keane and Runkle (1990) among 
many others: 
(i) unbiasedness   
(ii) efficiency.   





t f t ε π α α π + + = + 1 0           ( 3 )  




t E π ε =0. If the joint hypothesis that 
0 : 0 0 = α H  and  1 1 = α  is rejected, then the hypothesis of unbiasedness and, with it, the 
hypothesis of partial rationality is rejected.    4
The efficiency of inflation expectations, on the other hand, requires that any variable 
known at time t or before to be orthogonal to the forecast error. That is, if expectations are 
efficient, no variable known at time t or before should help to reduce the forecast error.  




t f t X ε β β π π + + = − + 1 0          ( 4 )  
where  t X  is any variable in the information set at time t.
1 In the context of equation (4) at 
least two empirical tests for efficiency of inflation expectations can be carried out as was done 
in Brown and Maital (1981), Forsells and Kenny (2002) and Lyziak (2003) among many 
others. In one rather weak test,  t X  only includes the past forecast (expectational) errors. In 
this kind of a test, we see whether forecasters (or agents that form expectations) indeed learn 
from their past forecast errors or not. If the hypothesis is rejected, we can conclude that the 
forecast error could have been further reduced if the agents had taken into account the 
previous forecast errors and that agents have not made efficient use of the past errors. The 
second test, which is a more revealing one, involves the testing of whether the forecast error is 
correlated with a broader set of variables whose values were known when the forecast was 
made. In this case,  t X  includes lagged policy and state variables which had known values at 
the time of the forecast.  
If neither the unbiasedness nor the efficiency hypotheses are rejected, we can conclude 
that expectations are not irrational in the sense that all available, relevant information was in 
fact optimally used in forming expectations. 
Estimation 
Although the estimation of the test equations (3) and (4) seem straightforward, there are 
some problems associated with it. The OLS estimates of the parameters in (3) and (4) would 




t E π ε =0 for (3) and  ( ) t
f
t X E ε =0 for 
(4). However, the conventionally computed standard errors under OLS are inconsistent, 
because the residuals in equation (3) and (4) are shown to be serially correlated for forecast 
horizons longer than 1- period. As put forth by Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Brown and 








t E ε ε  for 
                                                 
1 The residuals of equation (3) and (4) are both denoted by 
f
t ε , because they are equal to each under the null 
hypotheses:  0 : 0 0 = α H  and  1 1 = α  and  0 : 1 0 1 = = β β H .    5
h = 1, 2, ...,f-1. In other words, the f-period ahead expectation errors would be generated by 
an  MA(f-1) process. Therefore, only for f=1, will the expectation error be serially 
uncorrelated.  
To obtain a consistent covariance matrix and thus realiable test statistics for our 
hypotheses we used OLS but made the appropriate modifications in the estimation of the 
asymptotic covariance matrix as done by Hansen (1982). We allowed for serial correlation up 
to a moving average of order f-1 in the estimate of the covariance matrix, and used Newey-
West covariance matrix to ensure positive definiteness.  
III.  Data and Empirical Results 
In this section we describe the data used in testing the rationality of inflation expectations,   
giving brief information about the different surveys from which the expectation series are 
taken from. We then report and evaluate the empirical results for each survey.  
In testing for the rationality of inflation expectations in Turkey, we made use of 5 
different inflation expectation series taken from 3 different surveys. These three surveys are 
the Expectations Survey, the Business Tendency Survey and the Manufacturing Industry 
Monthly Tendency Survey (Table 1).  
Table 1: Inflation Expectations Series Used in the Analysis 
Inflation Expectation  Horizon Source 
Current-month CPI   1  Expectations Survey, CBRT 
Next 2 months’ CPI  3  Expectations Survey, CBRT 
Next 12 months’ CPI  13  Expectations Survey, CBRT 
Next 12 months’ WPI  13  Business Tendency Survey, CBRT 
Next months’ Manufacturing Industry 
Sales Price  
1  Manufacturing Industry Tendency 
Survey, SIS 
 
The Expectations Survey : 
The Expectations Survey, which is held by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
(CBRT), is used to analyze the expectations for CPI inflation in Turkey. The survey, which 
was first conducted on August 3, 2001, contains the expectations and forecasts of real and 
financial sector representatives for inflation and other macroeconomic variables. The 
expectations data are compiled twice a month, once in the first and once in the third week of 
each month, following the announcement of the previous month’s inflation figures at the 3rd   6
of each month. The participants are requested to state their inflation expectations for the 
current month, 2 months ahead, year-end and 12-months ahead horizons.  
In our analysis we used the CPI inflation expectations for the current month, 2-months 
ahead and 12-months ahead periods and took the results of the first survey – the one that is 
compiled in the first week – as the inflation expectation of each month.  
Graph 1 plots the actual monthly CPI inflation rates with current-month and 2 months 
ahead inflation expectations. There does not seem to be a systematic bias in either of the 
expectation series, but there are some periods like the first half of 2002, where the agents 
consistently overestimated the inflation rates. As one would expect, the current month 
inflation expectations seem to track inflation better than the two-months ahead expectations. 
This is also supported by the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) statistic.
2 The RMSE of the 
current month inflation expectations is 0.82, while that of 2 months ahead is 1.02. 





































































































Expectation for current month
Expectation for 2-months ahead
 
On the other hand, the plot of the annual CPI inflation and the 12-month ahead annual 
inflation expectations, reveal that for the whole sample 12-month ahead expectations 
overshooted the realizations (Graph 2). This is indeed related to the fact that in forming 12-
month ahead inflation expectations, agents take into account the last available (known) annual 
inflation rate as well as the targeted disinflation path. Therefore, 12-month ahead inflation 
expectations steadily fall complying to the disinflation path, but do not fall enough because 
                                                 












t π π ε − = +  is the f months ahead forecast error given information It 
available at time t,  f t+ π the realized value at time t+f and 
f
t π  the forecast of  f t+ π  with information set It.T is the sample 
size.   7
they are affected by the realized annual inflation rates.
3 From the plot in Graph 2, we would 
not expect the unbiasedness hypothesis to hold for 12-month ahead expectations, but 
nevertheless we held the tests also for this expectational variable.  
Before going on with the empirical investigation of the inflation expectations series 
mentioned above, a few points should be made clear. First of all, because the survey starts in 
August 2001, the number of observations is quite limited. By the time we made the analysis, 
there were 35 current-month expectation errors, 33 two-months ahead expectation errors and 
only 23 twelve-months ahead expectation errors. In fact the asymptotic covariance matrix that 
we estimate taking into account the serial correlation in the residuals, has desirable properties 
in large samples.












































































Expectation for 12-months ahead
 
Source: SIS, CBRT 
Another issue is related to the measurement of the expectation horizon. Since the inflation 
expectation for the current month is based on information available at –the first week of– that 
month, the forecast horizon seems to be 0 at first glance, i.e. expectation of inflation at time t, 
based on information at time t. However, since the inflation rate of the month, in which the 
survey is announced, is not known, the forecast horizon is in fact 1.  
The same reasoning is also relevant for the 2-months and 12-months ahead expectations. 
Take the survey of February 2004 for example. The 2-months ahead expectation corresponds 
to April 2004. Therefore, the forecast horizon seems like 2 periods, but it is indeed 3 periods, 
because the February 2004 inflation is not yet known to the agent at the first week of February 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed explanation see Box II.1 in Monetary Policy Report, October 2003, Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey.    8
2004, when the expectation is formed. Similarly, the 12-months ahead expectation is indeed a 
13-step ahead expectation. This information is important to infer the “true” autocorrelation 
pattern of the expectation errors: the expectation errors for 2-month and 12-month ahead CPI 
inflation follow MA(2) and MA(12) processes– rather than MA(1) and MA(11) processes – 
respectively.
5 The current-month forecast errors have no moving average component.  
Table 2 reports the estimation results for equation (3) for the expectations taken from the 
CBRT Survey of Expectations. While the hypothesis of unbiasedness is not rejected for the 
current-month expectations (1-step ahead expectations) at 10 percent significance level, it is 
strongly rejected for the next 2-month’s and next 12-month’s expectations.   
Table 2: Unbiasedness Tests for CPI Inflation Expectations (CBRT Survey of Expectations) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Expectation Sample  Sample
Size 
0 α   1 α  
2 χ   MA 
Monthly CPI Inflation  Current-month 2001:08-2004:06  35 -0.53  1.14  2.52   0 
       (0.252)  (0.100)  (0.10)   
Monthly CPI Inflation 2-months  ahead 2001:10-2004:06 33  -0.69 1.14 11.39   2 
       (0.301)  (0.178)  (0.00)   
Annual CPI Inflation  12-months ahead  2002:08-2004:06  23  -1.65  0.75  167.8   12 
       (6.220)  (0.156)  (0.00)   
Note: Standard errors are in parantheses under coefficients; significance levels are given under 
2 χ statistics.  
The test statistic is an F-stat for current-month expectations since the MA order is 0 in that case. H0 : α0=0, α1=1. 
The estimation results revealed that the  1 α  coefficient for 2-months ahead expectations is 
not statistically different from 1 just like the one for current-month expectations.
6 However, 
the  0 α  coefficient on the constant term is more negative and statistically significant for 2-
months ahead expectations, leading to the rejection of unbiasedness hypothesis for this series. 
The negative and significant constant term suggests that 2-months ahead expectations have a 
tendecy to overestimate inflation. The tendency to overestimate inflation is even more 
prevelant for next 12 months’ expectations, which has an  1 α  coefficient statistically not 
different from 1 at %11 significance level but has a constant more negative than that of both 
current-month and 2-months ahead expectations, though it is not statistically significant.    
To see whether the CPI inflation expectations are efficient, we estimated equation (4) first 
with only the recent past forecast errors as explanatory variables. We carried out this test only 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 See Chapter 10 of Johnston and Dinardo (1997).  
5 Keane and Runkle (1990) also noticed this issue and stated that in surveys, where πt is not known when the 
forecast π
f
t is made, forecast errors will be MA(f) rather than MA(f-1), as they would be if the forecasters knew πt 
when they made their forecasts.   
6 The hypotheses  1 1 = α  for current-month and 2-months ahead expectations have p-values 0.16 and 0.42 
respectively.   9
for the current-month and 2-months ahead expectations since the sample size was not enough 
to do it for the 12-months ahead expectations. The most recent expectation error known when 
expectations about the current month are formed, is the previous month’s expectation error. 
That is, the expectation error for the current month should not be correlated with the 
expectation error of the previous month or the months before the previous month, for weak-
efficiency to hold. For 2-months ahead expectations, on the other hand, the most recent 
expectation error that is known at the time of the expectation is the one of three months 
earlier. That is, when making an expectation about April 2004’s inflation in February 2004, 
the agent observes the expectation error of January 2004 – the difference between the January 
expectation formed in November 2003 and the realized January inflation. The results are 
reported in Table 3.1.  
 
 
Table 3.1: Weak Efficiency Tests for CPI Inflation Expectations 




Expectation Sample  Sample
Size 
0 β   1 β   2 β  
2 χ   MA 
Monthly CPI Inflation  Current-month  2001:10-2004:06  33  -0.31 0.04 -0.14 2.25  0 
        (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.10)   
Monthly CPI Inflation  Next 2-months   2002:01-2004:06  29 -0.49  -0.07 - 8.94  2 
       (0.17)  (0.18)  -  (0.01)   
Note: Standard errors are in parantheses under coefficients; significance levels are given under 
2 χ statistics.  
The test statistic is an F-stat for current-month expectations since the MA order is 0 in that case. H0:β0=β1=β2 =0. 












3 ) ( t t t t t ε π π β β π π + − + = − − +  
As suggested by the 
2 χ statistics, the weak efficiency holds for expectations about the 
current month inflation but is rejected for 2-months ahead expectations. A second, stronger 
test of efficiency for the CPI inflation expectations, can be done by including policy and state 
variables as explanatory variables in equation (4), whose values were known at the time of the 
forecast. Following the reasoning in Brown and Maital (1981) we included two types of 
lagged explanatory variables – those that are believed to reflect monetary and fiscal policy 
and those that reflect the state of the economy when the expectations are formed.  
The three policy variables chosen were: onc, the annual compounded overnight interest 
rate at the interbank money market, whose value is set by the Central Bank in view of future 
path of consumer price inflation; dps, the monthly percentage change in the real primary 
surplus (consolidated budget); ddd , the monthly percentage change in the net domestic debt 
stock of the Treasury.    10




t π π , , the monthly percentage change in consumer 
and wholesale prices; cu, the capacity utilization rate of the manufacturing industry; sales, the 
monthly percentage change in the sales of the manufacturing industry, der,  the monthly 
percentage change in the exchange rate, TL/USD. 
7 
The proposed variables are lagged appropriately, in a way to be consistent with the 
information set used in forming the expectations (See Appendix 1). For example, in 
explaining the 1-step ahead (current-month) expectation error, the first lags of 
WPI CPI π π , , der 
and onc and the second lags of dps, ddd, cu and sales are used as explanatory variables, 
because their values were known at the time of the forecast. With the same reasoning, the 
third lags of 
WPI CPI π π , , der and onc and the fourth lags of dps, ddd, cu and sales are used as 
explanatory variables in explaining the 3-step ahead (next 2-months) expectation error.  
Table 3.2: Strong Efficiency Tests for CPI Inflation Expectations  
(CBRT Survey of Expectations) 
Exp. Var.     
        Dep.Var 
1
1 t t π π − +  
3
3 t t π π − +  























t 1 − π   0.14 
(0.31)  -  -0.06 
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Sample  01:08- 04:06  01:08- 04:06  01:10-04:06  01:10-04:06  01:10-04:06 
Sample  size  35 35 33 33 33 
MA  0 0 2 2 2 
Note: Parentheses under coefficients and 
2 χ statistics are p-values.  The test statistic is an F-stat for current-
month expectations since the MA order is 0 in that case. H0:βi= 0. 
 
                                                 
7 The annual change in the industrial production index, monthly GDP gap and the treasury bill rate in the 
primary market are also tried as state variables. Their results are not reported since they do not imply a change in 
the results.    11
The estimation results reported in Table 3.2 show that for the current-month expectations 
the null hypothesis of efficiency is not rejected. Using the full set of variables shown in the 
first column of Table 3.2, we obtained an F-stat with p-value 0.26. When we controlled for 
the effects of strong correlation among some of the variables such as the CPI and WPI 
inflation, and the capacity utilization rate and manufacturing industry sales by excluding WPI 
inflation and sales from the first equation, we ended up with a p-value of 0.22 for the F-stat. 
8 
The estimation results with the same variables but with different lag structures consistent 
with the 3-months horizon show that the null hypothesis of efficiency is strongly rejected for 
the next 2-month’s inflation expectations. The rather surprising part of this result is that the 
only individually significant variable in explaining the expectation error is the depreciation 
rate, which is a key variable that is monitored by all agents in the economy. The highly 
significant positive coefficient of the depreciation rate points out to the fact that when forming 
expectations about the next two month’s inflation rate, agents do not fully incorporate the 
average depreciation rate of the previous month. That is, agents are not fully aware of the 
lagged effects of the exchange rate depreciation on monthly inflation. Agents lack information 
about the true pattern of exchange-rate pass-through to inflation. This may come from the fact 
that, the Turkish experience with the floating exchange rate regime is limited. Prior to 
February 2001, there was always some kind of a real exchange-rate peg, which led to an 
immediate pass-through of exchange rate to inflation since the changes in the exchange rate 
were perceived to be permanent. However, with the adoption of the floating exchange rate 
regime, the duration of the exchange-rate pass-through lengthened because there is greater 
uncertainty concerning the “permanence” of the change in the exchange rate. 
9 
When the three-period lagged depreciation rate is excluded from the test equation the 
2 χ  
statistic leads to the non-rejection of the efficiency hypothesis for the next 2 months 
expectations, but the conclusion should be based on the test-statistic obtained using the 
complete information set at hand.  
The efficiency tests for the next 12 months ahead inflation expectations are carried out but 
not reported because of very low degrees of freedom. However, the estimations done by using 
appropriately lagged and differenced variables defined above, lead to a strong rejection of the 
efficiency hypothesis for 12-month ahead expectations series. 
                                                 
8 Other alternative nested models were also estimated, none of them led to the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
9 See Kara et. al. (2005) for a detailed analysis of how exchange rate pass-through changed with the floating 
regime.     12
In sum, only the current-month inflation expectations are found to be unbiased and 
efficient among the three series taken from the CBRT Survey of Expectations. The full 
rationality hypotheses are rejected for the next 2-months and next 12-months inflation 
expectations.  
Expectations from the Business Tendency Survey 
The Business Tendency Survey (BTS), which has been conducted by the CBRT since 
December 1987, includes answers of the private industrial enterprises – chosen on the basis of 
Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s ranking of the biggest 1000 firms – on various questions 
related to orders, stocks, costs, production, selling prices, inflation and interest rates.  
There are three inflation expectations in the BTS: One is for the next three month’s 
inflation, which is in the qualitative form, reported as the proportion of respondents expecting 
a “rise”, a “fall” or “no change” in inflation in the next 3 months. The other two are the 
quantitative expectations for the year-end and the next 12 months’ WPI inflation expectations, 
respectively. To avoid the problems related to quantification of the qualitative data we did not 
analyze the qualitative next 3 months’ inflation expectation. 
10 The expectations for the year-
end inflation are also not analyzed because the fixed forecast horizon requires modifications 
in our testing procedure. 
11 
Although the BTS has been compiled since December 1987, the quantitative question for 
the next 12-months inflation was added in January 1999. Therefore the first next 12 months’ 
WPI inflation expectation corresponds to January 2000, leaving us with 54 observations until 
June 2004.  
Because of the wider content of the Business Tendency Survey compared to the Survey of 
Expectations, both in terms of the number of survey questions and the number of respondents, 
the respondents of the former are given a longer time (almost the full month) to fill out the 
survey compared to that of the latter. Therefore, although both surveys are announced in the 
first week of each month, the BTS includes expectations formed in the previous month, while 
the Survey of Expectations include the expectations formed in the current month (See 
Appendix 1).  
To be more precise, suppose that we are in the first week of February 2004 and both the 
BTS and the Survey of Expectations are announced. While the BTS announced in the first 
                                                 
10 Karadaş and Öğünç (2003) test the rational expectations hypothesis for the qualitative next-3-month’s 
inflation expectations. Their results fail to reject rationality for the 1989:04-1998:04 period.    13
week of February 2004 includes expectations formed at January 2004, the Survey of 
Expectations includes expectations formed at (the first week of) February 2004. The 
respondents of the BTS are supposed to send January expectations until the 3
rd of February 
2004, while that of the Expectations Survey start to fill February expectations after the 3
rd of 
February. Therefore, while the respondents of the BTS announced in February do not know 
January inflation figures, that of the Survey of Expectations do.
12 However, this does not 
create an important informational difference because, as the BTS announced in February 
includes expectations formed in January while the Survey of Expectations announced at the 
same time includes expectations formed in February, neither the respondents of the BTS nor 
that of the Survey of Expectations are aware of the inflation figures of the month in which 
they are forming their expectations. Consequently, the next 12 months’ WPI inflation 
expectations taken from the BTS involves a 13-step ahead expectation error, just like the next 
12 months’ CPI inflation expectations taken from the Survey of expectations. In other words, 
both expectation errors have MA(12) autocorrelation patterns.  







































































































Expectation for 12-months ahead
 
Source: SIS, CBRT 
Before going on with the empirical test of unbiasedness, it would be beneficial to take a 
look at the plot of the next 12 months’ WPI inflation expectations and realizations (Graph 3). 
The plot of the data suggest that there is a high bias proportion in next 12 months’ WPI 
inflation expectations. This bias was downward for the period between March 2001 and 
March 2002 – because of the currency crisis in February 2001 that led to the acceleration of 
inflation starting with March 2001. The downward bias diminished in March 2002, because 
                                                                                                                                                          
11 See Bakshi, Kapetanios and Yates (2003) for a test of rational hypothesis on fixed-horizon inflation forecasts.  
12 Inflation figures of each month are announced on the 3
rd of the following month. For example, January 
inflation figures are announced on the 3
rd of February.   14
agents were aware of the crisis in March 2001 when they were forming 12-month ahead 
expectations. Following this period, expectations exhibited a systematic upward bias, most 
probably because of the reasons we discussed for the 12-month ahead expectations taken from 
the Survey of Expectations, namely the dependence of the agents on past realized inflation 
rates although the economy is in a continuous disinflation process. 
Table 4: Unbiasedness Tests for WPI Inflation Expectations (BTS) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Expectation Sample  Sample
Size 
0 α   1 α  
2 χ   MA 
Annual WPI Inflation  Next 12-months 2000:01-2004:06  54  35.3 0.19  6.2 12 
       (38.9)  (0.69)  (0.04)   
Annual WPI Inflation  Next 12-months   2002:08-2004:06  23  -15.6 0.91  389.2  12 
       (6.40)  (0.10)  (0.00)   
Note: Standard errors are in parantheses under coefficients; significance levels are given under 
2 χ statistics.  
H0 : α0=0, α1=1 for equation (3). 
Not surprisingly, the empirical tests of unbiasedness resulted in rejection of the null 
hypothesis for the whole sample, namely 2000:01-2004:06. The test results did not change 
when the effects of the crisis in 2001:01 are removed by restricting the sample to 2002:08-
2004:06
13 although the coefficient of the expectation term became closer to 1. Indeed, for the 
latter sample  1 α  coefficient is statistically not different from 1 with a significance level (p-
value) of 0.35 as shown in Table 4. These results suggest that as in the case of the next 12 
months’ CPI inflation expectations taken from the Survey of Expectations, the next 12 
months’ WPI expectations taken from the BTS are good in tracking the trend in inflation but 
they overestimate the level of inflation. The upward bias shows itself as a significant negative 
constant term. 
Table 5.1: Weak Efficiency Tests for WPI Inflation Expectations (BTS) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Expectation Sample  Sample
Size  0 β   1 β  
2 χ   MA 
Annual WPI Inflation  Next 12-months 2001:02-2004:06  41  1.04 -0.37  13.17  12 
       (12.5)  (0.32)  (0.00)   
Annual WPI Inflation  Next 12-months   2002:08-2004:06 23 -19.39  -0.03  22.88  12 
       (1.21)  (0.03)  (0.00)   
Note: Standard errors are in parantheses under coefficients; significance levels are given under 
2 χ statistics.  
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The weak test of efficiency, done by estimating equation (4) with the previous forecast 
error as an explanatory variable, leads to the strong rejection of the efficiency hypothesis, 
                                                 
13 This is the same sample available for the next 12 months’ ahead expectations of CPI inflation taken from the 
Survey of Expectations. It is used to make the results for the two expectation series comparable.    15
although the coefficient of the lagged error term is individually insignificant (Table 5.1). The 
rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the previous error term, if taken into account, 
could have reduced the expectation error. The results do not change when the sample is 
restricted to 2002:08-2004:06 to get rid of the effect of the crisis on the expectation error.  
For the second test of efficiency based on equation (4), we used the same set of policy and 
state variables as in the case of tests for the expectations taken from the Survey of 
Expectations, but this time taking the annual differences of the level variables, since 
expectations are for annual inflation. As discussed above, when the BTS expectations are 
formed, say at time t, inflation rates of time t are not known. However, it is more likely that 
the monthly average exchange rate and interest rates of period t are known. In addition, the t-1 
values of the the capacity utilization rate, the domestic debt stock and the primary surplus as 
well as the t-2  value of the industrial production are known to the agent when forming 
expectations at time t. 
14(See Appendix 1). 
Table 5.2: Strong Efficiency Tests for WPI Inflation Expectations (BTS) 
Exp. Var.     
        Dep.Var 
13
13 t t π π − +  
13
13 t t π π − +   Exp. Var.     
        Dep.Var 
13
13 t t π π − +  
13
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Sample 00:01-04:06  00:01-04:06  Sample 00:01-04:06  00:01-04:06 
Sample size  54  54  Sample size  54  54 
MA 12  12  MA 12  12 
Note: Parentheses under coefficients and 
2 χ statistics are p-values.  The test statistic is an F-stat for current-
month expectations since the MA order is 0 in that case. H0:βi= 0. 
                                                 
14 In order to have a precise understanding of which information was available to the respondents, the responding 
dates of the agents may be checked. Here, we implicitly assume that most of the respondents fill the surveys in 
the last week of the month.    16
Thus, for efficiency hypothesis to hold, the expectation error related to the next 12 
months’ inflation, should be orthogonal to these appropriately lagged variables. But, as can be 
seen from Table 5.2 efficiency hypothesis is strongly rejected for the next 12 months’ WPI 
inflation expectations. The results do not change if we exclude CPI inflation, which is highly 
correlated with WPI inflation, and capacity utilization rate, which is correlated with annual 
change in industrial production index (second column of Table 5.2).
15 This may be stemming 
from two facts: First, agents forming expectations about next 12 months’ WPI inflation may 
not really be utilizing the available information in forming expectations. Secondly, the 
majority of the respondents may be giving back the results before waiting for the last week of 
the time allowance and thus may not be having a chance to see the recent announced values of 
the related variables, which could have been used in forming their expectations. To leave out 
this possibility we reestimated the equations in the first panel of Table 5.2, but this time by 
lagging some of the variables whose values become known towards the end of the month, 
such as the percentage change in average exchange rate, overnight interest rates, capacity 
utilization rate and fiscal variables. 
16However, according to the estimation results reported in 
the second panel of Table 5.2, the efficiency hypothesis is still strongly rejected for the next 
12 months WPI inflation expectations.  
To conclude the next 12 months’ WPI inflation expectations are not rational since the 
unbiasedness hypothesis is rejected at the first place and at the second place all the available 
information is not used efficiently by the agents that form these expectations.  
Expectations from the Manufacturing Industry Tendency Survey (MITS) 
The last survey that we use to analyze inflation expectations is the Manufacturing Industry 
Tendency Survey (MITS), which is prepared monthly by the State Institute of Statistics since 
February 1991. The MITS includes production, sales and sales price expectations of nearly 
1200 private and public enterprises which produce approximately 70 percent of the total 
manufacturing industry value added. Since this survey is applied to the manufacturing 
                                                 
15 Various nested models of the first model are tried, other variables such as the Treasury bill rate and the 
percentage change in average petroleum price index are added to the models but the test results did not change. 
What is more, controlling for the effects of the crisis by starting the sample from 2002:05 did not also change the 
results.    
16 Industrial production index at time t is announced in the first week of t+2. Capacity utilization rate and 
domestic borrowing figures at time t are announced in the third week of t+1, while primary surplus of time t is 
publicly known in the last week of time t+1. Although their daily values are known, the monthly averages of the 
exchange rate and the overnight interest rate become available at the end of each month.   
    17
industry, the sales price inflation expectation of the next month can be regarded as total 
manufacturing industry inflation expectation.  
MITS questionnaires are sent to the enterprises in the third week of each month and are 
expected to be filled and returned until the end of each month. Therefore, when filling the 
sales price expectation of the next month, inflation rate of the current month is available to the 
respondent. Therefore, MITS next months’ sales price expectation is a 1-step ahead 
expectation just like the current month expectation of the Survey of Expectations.       
The plot of the next month’s expected manufacturing industry inflation and the realization 
show that the expectations track the general trend of monthly inflation well but for most of the 
time stay below the realizations (Graph 4). This is an interesting observation because the 
participants of the survey are in fact the actual price setters. The level difference may stem 
from the fact that each participant reflects the expectation about his own sector’s sales price 
and the weights used in combining each sector to reach the overall manufacturing industry 
sales price expectation (weights based on value added) are different than the weights used in 
constructing the official manufacturing sector price index.  



















































































Expectation for 1-months ahead
 
Source: CBRT, SIS   
In accordance with the plot of the data, the empirical test led to a rejection of the null 
hypothesis of unbiasedness for both the whole sample and the 2001:08-2004:06 sample as 
shown in Table 5. However, while the individual  1 α  coefficient is found to be significantly 
greater than 1 for the whole sample, it is statistically not different from 1 for the post-crisis 
sample with a significance level of 0.35. This points to the fact that, the downward bias in the 
next month’s expectations decreased in the latter sample, but the unbiasedness hypothesis is 
still rejected for manufacturing sector inflation expectations.   18
Table 6: Unbiasedness Tests for Manufacturing Sector Inflation Expectations (MITS) 
Dependent 
Variable  Expectation Sample  Sample
Size  0 α   1 α   F-stat  MA 
Monthly Man. Inf.  Next month 1991:02-2004:06  161  0.35 1.38  125.1    0 
       (0.16)  (0.04)  0.00   
Monthly Man. Inf.  Next month 2001:08-2004:06 35  0.46 1.18 6.28    0 
       (0.31)  (0.19)  0.00   
Note: Standard errors are in parantheses under coefficients; significance levels are given under F-statistics.  
The test statistic is an F-stat since the MA order is 0 for next month’s expectations. H0 : α0=0, α1=1. 
To see how the coefficients of the test equation in Table 6 varied over time, we used three 
year rolling samples. The first sample is between 1991:02 and 1994:01, for which the 
coefficient of the expectation term is 0.97 and statistically not different from 1. Rolling the 
sample three steps and arriving at the 1991:05-1994:04 sample, which is the first sample that 
includes the 1994 crisis, the coefficient rises to 1.42 and becomes statistically greater than 1 
until April 1997. After this date, 1994 crisis falls out of the sample and the coefficient of the 
expectation term starts to decrease until another upward level shift in 2001, which lasts until 
March 2004 (Graph 5). For the last three samples that are considered, the  1 α  coefficient is 
statistically not different from 1, but the unbiasedness hypothesis is still rejected. 
17  
 

































































Notes:    i)Rolling samples are marked by ending observations, i.e. the coefficient plotted against 
1994:01  comes from the estimation made for 1991:02-1994:01 sample.  
            ii)C1 and C2 refer to  0 α  and  1 α in Table 6, respectively. 
The point of this analysis is that the 1994 and 2001 crises play an important role in the 
rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis for manufacturing sector inflation expectations. Not 
only during the crisis months but also in the following months agents in the manufacturing 
sector systematically underestimated the manufacturing sector inflation. This may be due to   19
the fact that agents underpredicted the exchange-rate pass-through to prices following the 
crises that both brought about large devaluations. 
Table 7.1: Weak Efficiency Tests for Manufacturing Sector Inflation Expectations 
Dependent 
Variable 
Expectation Sample  Sample
Size 
0 β   1 β   2 β   F-
stat 
MA 
Monthly Man. Inf.  Next month  1991:04-2004:06  159  0.99 0.26 0.02 46.4 0 
        (0.18) (0.08) (0.08) (0.00)   
Monthly Man. Inf.  Next month  2001:08-2004:06  35  0.43 0.36 0.03  5.9 0 
        (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) (0.00)   
Note: Standard errors are in parantheses under coefficients; significance levels are given under F-statistics.  
The test statistic is an F-stat since the MA order is 0. H0:β0=β1=β2 =0. The equation estimated for 2 different 
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The weak efficiency test is also rejected for the next month’s manufacturing sector 
inflation expectations (Table 7.1). This suggests that in forming expectations about next 
month, respondents do not take into account their previous expectation error.  
Table 7.2: Strong Efficiency Tests for Manufacturing Sector Inflation Expectations 
Exp. Var.     
        Dep.Var 
1
1 t t π π − +  
1
1 t t π π − +  












t π   -0.05 
(0.52)  -  -0.08 
(0.68)  - 
man
































salest-1  0.01 
(0.48)  -  0.02 


























Sample  91:04- 04:06  01:08-04:06 
Sample size  159  159 
 
35 35 
MA 0  0    0  0 
Note: Parentheses under coefficients and 
2 χ statistics are p-values. The test statistic is an F-stat for current-
month expectations since the MA order is 0 in that case. H0:βi= 0. 
                                                                                                                                                          
17 The unbiasedness hypothesis is rejected for all (126) of the 3-year width rolling samples that we considered.     20
For the second test of efficiency the same set of variables that are used in the test for 
current and next 2 months’ monthly CPI expectations are utilized. Estimation results of 
equation (4) with these variables are given in Table 7.2, first for the whole sample and then 
for the 2001:08-2004:06 sample – to compare with current month expectations from the 
Survey of Expectations. The hypothesis of efficiency is rejected for both samples and for 
alternative specifications nested in model (1) implying that manufacturing sector inflation 
expectations
 are not rational.
18 It is worth noting that exchange rate depreciation has a positive 
and significant coefficient in explaining one step ahead manufacturing sector inflation 
expectation in both samples for all alternative specifications that we considered as in the case 
of next 2 months CPI inflation expectations taken from the Survey of Expectations.  
IV. Conclusion 
We have tested the rationality of inflation expectations in Turkey using 5 distinct inflation 
expectations data from 3 different surveys. Our empirical results revealed that (partial) 
rationality hypothesis holds only for the one-month ahead CPI inflation expectations. The test 
results for the 12 month ahead CPI and WPI expectation series suggest that both tend to track 
the general trend in inflation, but they consistently overestimate the level of inflation, WPI 
expectations having a relatively higher bias proportion compared to CPI expectations. 
Furthermore, while the 2-month-ahead CPI inflation expectations exhibit an upward bias, 1-
month ahead manufacturing sector inflation expectations reveal a downward bias. 
Interestingly, errors related to both the next 2 months’ CPI inflation and next months’ 
manufacturing sector inflation expectations are significantly correlated with exchange rate 
depreciation. In other words, the survey respondents, to a great extent, do not incorporate the 
impact of exchange rate variations in their expectations! This finding is quite surprising, given 
that exchange rate movements are one of the main determinants of short run fluctuations in 
Turkish inflation.
19  
The rejection of the rationality hypotheses for most of the inflation expectations series at 
hand suggests that private agents’ expectations should not serve as the main “response 
variable” for the monetary authority.
20 This argument echoes Bernanke and Woodford’s 
                                                 
18 Using monthly private manufacturing sector inflation, Us and Metin-Özcan (2005) find that near-rational 
expectations—as described by optimal univariate expectations where agents use information on past inflation 
optimally while data on other variables are ignored—fit the data better than the perfectly rational or purely 
adaptive expectations.  
19 There is ample evidence on exchange rate pass-through weakening in the floating exchange rate period, 
though. However, the cumulative impact is still sizeable. See Kara et. al. 2005 for more details. 
20 Central Bank of Turkey, through its monthly reports and press releases, has expressed this fact several times.   21
(1997) conclusion that, “although private-sector forecasts may contain information useful to 
the central bank, ultimately the monetary authorities must rely on an explicit structural model 
of the economy to guide their policy decisions”. Needless to say, central bank, by sharing its 
view on the transmission mechanism may contribute to the private agents’ understanding of 
the economy. This is particularly important for not going into an “expectation trap”.  
That said, not all our findings are unpleasant regarding the inflation expectations. In fact, 
part of our analysis here—of rather long expectation series such as the next 12 months WPI 
inflation and next months manufacturing sector inflation expectations—conveys that bias 
proportions are falling and efficiency is increasing since the implementation of the floating 
exchange rate. In other words, private agents are becoming better inflation forecasters in time. 
However, some form of deviation from rational expectations may still be necessary—at least 
during the disinflation period—in modeling inflation dynamics.   22
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A.1: Time-table of Data Announcements 
  t t+1  t+2  Source 
Expectations       
f
t cpi π   + 
(first 
week) 
    Expectations Survey, CBRT 
f
t wpi π    + 
(first 
week) 
  Business Tendency Survey, CBRT 
f
t man π    + 
(third 
week) 
  Manufacturing Industry Tendency 
Survey, SIS 
State Variables       




dert  + 
 
   CBRT 
cut   + 
(third 
week) 
  Manufacturing Industry Tendency 
Survey, SIS 
salest   + 
(third 
week) 
  Manufacturing Industry Tendency 
Survey, SIS 




Policy Variables       
onct  + 
 
   CBRT 
ddt   + 
(last 
week) 
  Condolidated Budget Domestic Debt, 
Treasury 
pst   + 
(third 
week) 
  Public Accounts Bulletin, Ministry of 
Finance 
Note: t refers to a month.  
 
Table A.2: Abbreviations 
f
t cpi π   f-step ahead CPI inflation expectations  cut  Capacity utilization rate, Manufacturing Industry 
f
t wpi π   f-step ahead WPI inflation expectations  salest  Sales, Manufacturing Industry 
f
t man π   f-step ahead WPI inflation expectations  ipt  Industrial Production Index 
t cpi π   CPI Inflation  onct  Overnight borrowing rate at Interbank Money 
Market 
t wpi π   WPI Inflation  ddt  Domestic Debt Stock, Consolidated Budget 
t man π   Manufacturing Industry Sales Price 
Inflation  dpst  Primary Surplus, Consolidated Budget 
dert  Average Exchange Rate Depreciation     
 